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Effect of conformity on evolution of cooperation in a coordination game |
| Xianjia Wang(王先甲)1,2 and Tao Wang(王饕)1,† |
1 Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China;
2 Institute of Systems Engineering, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China |
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Abstract Individual decision-making processes are not solely driven by self-interest maximization but are also influenced by the pressure to conform to the group. In primary games like the prisoner's dilemma, the presence of conformity pressure may facilitate the constructive development of cooperative behavior. In this study, we investigate how conformity influences the growth of cooperation in complicated coordination games. Our findings reveal that, even in the presence of stringent game rules, conformity can promote cooperation. In fact, a certain level of conformity pressure can even eliminate the "defection basin" of deer hunting games played on regular networks. Additionally, we demonstrate that the effect of conformity on cooperative behavior is contingent upon the degree of conformity pressure, with different levels of conformity pressure producing opposite effects. These findings provide novel insights into the promotion of cooperative evolution. For instance, if increasing the reward for cooperation has proven ineffective, manipulating the proportion of initial strategy choices may be a more promising approach.
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Received: 28 February 2023
Revised: 16 May 2023
Accepted manuscript online: 30 May 2023
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PACS:
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02.50.Le
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(Decision theory and game theory)
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05.45.Pq
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(Numerical simulations of chaotic systems)
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| Fund: This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 72031009), the National Social Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 20&ZD058), and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 72101189). The numerical calculations in this paper were carried out on the supercomputing system in the Supercomputing Center of Wuhan University. |
Corresponding Authors:
Tao Wang
E-mail: wtwhuem@whu.edu.cn
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Cite this article:
Xianjia Wang(王先甲) and Tao Wang(王饕) Effect of conformity on evolution of cooperation in a coordination game 2023 Chin. Phys. B 32 100202
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