Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on Newman--Watts socialnetworks with an asymmetric payoff distribution mechanism

doi:10.1088/1674-1056/19/1/010204

Abstract In this paper, we introduce an asymmetric payoff distribution mechanism into the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) on Newman--Watts social networks, and study its effects on the evolution of cooperation. The asymmetric payoff distribution mechanism can be adjusted by the parameter α: if $\alpha>0$, the rich will exploit the poor to get richer; if $\alpha<0$, the rich are forced to offer part of their income to the poor. Numerical results show that the cooperator frequency monotonously increases with α and is remarkably promoted when $\alpha>0$. The effects of updating order and self-interaction are also investigated. The co-action of random updating and self-interaction can induce the highest cooperation level. Moreover, we employ the Gini coefficient to investigate the effect of asymmetric payoff distribution on the the system's wealth distribution. This work may be helpful for understanding cooperative behaviour and wealth inequality in society.

Keywords: prisoner's dilemma game cooperation complex social networks

Received: 18 May 2009
Revised: 22 June 2009
Accepted manuscript online:

PACS:	89.75.Hc	(Networks and genealogical trees)
	02.50.Le	(Decision theory and game theory)
	02.50.Ng	(Distribution theory and Monte Carlo studies)
	89.65.-s	(Social and economic systems)

Fund: Project supported by the Major State Basic Research Development Program of China (Grant No. 2004CB318109), Program for New Century Excellent Talents in University of China (Grant No. NCET-07-0787) and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 70601026).

Cite this article:

Du Wen-Bo(杜文博), Cao Xian-Bin(曹先彬), Yang Han-Xin(杨涵新), and Hu Mao-Bin(胡茂彬) Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on Newman--Watts socialnetworks with an asymmetric payoff distribution mechanism 2010 Chin. Phys. B 19 010204

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Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on Newman--Watts socialnetworks with an asymmetric payoff distribution mechanism

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