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Effects of information asymmetry on cooperation in the prisoners’ dilemma game |
Wang Xi-Peng(王锡朋)a), Jiang Luo-Luo(姜罗罗) b)†, and Wang Bing-Hong(汪秉宏)a)‡ |
a Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China; b College of Physics and Electronic Information Engineering, Wenzhou University, Wenzhou 325035, China |
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Abstract Effects of information asymmetry on cooperation in the dilemma game of prisoners are investigated. The amplitude A is introduced to describe the degree of information asymmetry. It is found that there exists an optimal value of amplitude Aopt at which the fraction of cooperation reaches its maximal value. The reason lies in that cooperators on the two-dimensional grid form large clusters at Aopt. In addition, the theoretical analysis in terms of the mean-field theory is used to understand this kind of phenomenon. It is confirmed that the information asymmetry plays an important role in the dynamics of dilemma games of spatial prisoners.
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Received: 08 December 2011
Revised: 06 February 2012
Accepted manuscript online:
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PACS:
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02.50.Le
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(Decision theory and game theory)
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07.05.Tp
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(Computer modeling and simulation)
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87.23.Ge
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(Dynamics of social systems)
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Fund: Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 11047012, 91024026, and 10975126) and the Specialized Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of Higher Education of China (Grant No. 20093402110032). |
Corresponding Authors:
Jiang Luo-Luo, Wang Bing-Hong
E-mail: jiangluoluo@gmail.com;bhwang@ustc.edu.cn
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Cite this article:
Wang Xi-Peng(王锡朋), Jiang Luo-Luo(姜罗罗), and Wang Bing-Hong(汪秉宏) Effects of information asymmetry on cooperation in the prisoners’ dilemma game 2012 Chin. Phys. B 21 070210
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