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On fairness, full cooperation, and quantum game with incomplete information |
| Zhen-Zhou Lei(雷振州)1,4, Bo-Yang Liu(刘博阳)1, Ying Yi(易英)2, Hong-Yi Dai(戴宏毅)3, Ming Zhang(张明)1 |
1 College of Intelligent Science, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China;
2 School of Management, Xiamen University, Xiamen 361005, China;
3 Department of Physics, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China;
4 Automobile NCO Academy, Army Military Transportation University, Bengbu 233011, China |
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Abstract Quantum entanglement has emerged as a new resource to enhance cooperation and remove dilemmas. This paper aims to explore conditions under which full cooperation is achievable even when the information of payoff is incomplete. Based on the quantum version of the extended classical cash in a hat game, we demonstrate that quantum entanglement may be used for achieving full cooperation or avoiding moral hazards with the reasonable profit distribution policies even when the profit is uncertain to a certain degree. This research further suggests that the fairness of profit distribution should play an important role in promoting full cooperation. It is hopeful that quantum entanglement and fairness will promote full cooperation among distant people from various interest groups when quantum networks and quantum entanglement are accessible to the public.
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Received: 29 September 2017
Revised: 26 December 2017
Accepted manuscript online:
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PACS:
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02.50.Le
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(Decision theory and game theory)
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03.67.-a
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(Quantum information)
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03.65.-w
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(Quantum mechanics)
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| Fund: Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61673389, 61273202, and 61134008). |
Corresponding Authors:
Ming Zhang
E-mail: zhangming@nudt.edu.cn
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Cite this article:
Zhen-Zhou Lei(雷振州), Bo-Yang Liu(刘博阳), Ying Yi(易英), Hong-Yi Dai(戴宏毅), Ming Zhang(张明) On fairness, full cooperation, and quantum game with incomplete information 2018 Chin. Phys. B 27 030202
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