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The impact of honesty and trickery on a Bayesian quantum prisoners' dilemma game |
Bo-Yang Liu(刘博阳)1, Xin Zhao(赵鑫)2, Hong-Yi Dai(戴宏毅)3,4, Ming Zhang(张明)2, Ying Liao(廖鹰)1, Xiao-Feng Guo(郭晓峰)1, Wei Gao(郜伟)1 |
1 Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou 450001, China; 2 College of Artificial Intelligence, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China; 3 Department of Physics, College of Science, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China; 4 Interdisciplinary Center for Quantum Information, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China |
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Abstract To explore the influence of quantum information on the common social problem of honesty and trickery, we propose a Bayesian model for the quantum prisoners' dilemma game. In this model, the players' strategy formation is regarded as a negotiation of their move contract based on their types of decision policies, honesty or trickery. Although the implementation of quantum information cannot eliminate tricky players, players in our model can always end up with higher payoffs than in the classical game. For a good proportion of a credibility parameter value, a rational player will take an honest action, which is in remarkable contrast to the observation that players tend to defect in the classical prisoners' dilemma game. This research suggests that honesty will be promoted to enhance cooperation with the assistance of quantum information resources.
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Received: 22 January 2020
Revised: 07 April 2020
Accepted manuscript online:
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PACS:
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02.50.Le
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(Decision theory and game theory)
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03.67.Hk
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(Quantum communication)
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03.67.-a
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(Quantum information)
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Fund: Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61773399, 61673389, and 61273202) and the Special Funded Project of China Postdoctoral Science Foundation (Grant No. 2017T100792). |
Corresponding Authors:
Bo-Yang Liu
E-mail: boyangliu2011@hotmail.com
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Cite this article:
Bo-Yang Liu(刘博阳), Xin Zhao(赵鑫), Hong-Yi Dai(戴宏毅), Ming Zhang(张明), Ying Liao(廖鹰), Xiao-Feng Guo(郭晓峰), Wei Gao(郜伟) The impact of honesty and trickery on a Bayesian quantum prisoners' dilemma game 2020 Chin. Phys. B 29 070201
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