|
|
Adaptive co-evolution of strategies and network leading to optimal cooperation level in spatial prisoner's dilemma game |
Chen Han-Shuang(陈含爽)a), Hou Zhong-Huai(侯中怀)a)b)†, Zhang Ji-Qian(张季谦)c), and Xin Hou-Wen(辛厚文)a) |
a Department of Chemical Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China; b Hefei National Laboratory for Physical Sciences at Microscale, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China; c College of Physics and Electronic Information, Anhui Normal University, Wuhu 241000, China |
|
|
Abstract We study evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on adaptive networks where a population of players co-evolves with their interaction networks. During the co-evolution process, interacted players with opposite strategies either rewire the link between them with probability $p$ or update their strategies with probability $1-p$ depending on their payoffs. Numerical simulation shows that the final network is either split into some disconnected communities whose players share the same strategy within each community or forms a single connected network in which all nodes are in the same strategy. Interestingly, the density of cooperators in the final state can be maximised in an intermediate range of $p$ via the competition between time scale of the network dynamics and that of the node dynamics. Finally, the mean-field analysis helps to understand the results of numerical simulation. Our results may provide some insight into understanding the emergence of cooperation in the real situation where the individuals' behaviour and their relationship adaptively co-evolve.
|
Received: 30 July 2009
Revised: 28 October 2009
Accepted manuscript online:
|
PACS:
|
01.75.+m
|
(Science and society)
|
|
02.50.Le
|
(Decision theory and game theory)
|
|
02.50.Cw
|
(Probability theory)
|
|
02.60.Cb
|
(Numerical simulation; solution of equations)
|
|
89.75.Hc
|
(Networks and genealogical trees)
|
|
87.23.Cc
|
(Population dynamics and ecological pattern formation)
|
|
Fund: Project supported by the National
Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No.~20873130), the
Graduate Innovation Fund of USTC. |
Cite this article:
Chen Han-Shuang(陈含爽), Hou Zhong-Huai(侯中怀), Zhang Ji-Qian(张季谦), and Xin Hou-Wen(辛厚文) Adaptive co-evolution of strategies and network leading to optimal cooperation level in spatial prisoner's dilemma game 2010 Chin. Phys. B 19 050205
|
[1] |
Albert R and Barab\'{asi A-L 2002 Rev. Mod. Phys. 74 47
|
[2] |
Newman M E J 2003 SIAM Review 45 167
|
[3] |
Dorogovtsev S N and Mendes J F F 2002 Adv. Phys. 51 1079
|
[4] |
Boccaletti S, Latora V, Moreno Y, Chavez M and Hwang D U 2006 Phys. Rep. 424 175
|
[5] |
Watts D J and Strogatz S J 1998 Nature 393 440
|
[6] |
Barab\'{asi A-L and Albert R 1999 Science 286 509
|
[7] |
Barab\'{asi A-L, Albert R and Jeong H 1999 Physica A 272 173
|
[8] |
Zhou C and Kurths J 2006 Phys. Rev. Lett. 96 164102
|
[9] |
Holme P and Newman M E J 2006 Phys. Rev. E 74 056108
|
[10] |
Gil S and Zanette D H 2006 Phys. Lett. A 356 89
|
[11] |
Vazquez F, Egu\'{\hiluz V M and Miguel M S 2008 Phys. Rev. Lett. 100 108702
|
[12] |
Nardini C, Kozma B and Barrat A 2008 Phys. Rev. Lett. 100 158701
|
[13] |
Benczik S Z, Schmittmann B and Zia R K P 2008 Europhys. Lett. 82 48006
|
[14] |
Ebel H and Bornholdt S 2002 Phys. Rev. E 66 056118
|
[15] |
Zimmermann M G, Egu\'{\hiluz V M and Miguel M S 2004 Phys. Rev. E 69 065102(R)
|
[16] |
Zimmermann M G and Egu\'{\hiluz V M 2005 Phys. Rev. E 72 056118
|
[17] |
Egu{\hiluz V M, Zimmermann M G, Cela-Conde C J and Miguel M S 2005 Am. J. Sociol. 110 977
|
[18] |
Pacheco J M, Traulsen A and Nowak M A 2006 Phys. Rev. Lett. 97 258103
|
[19] |
Santos F C, Pacheco J M and Lenaerts T 2006 PLOS Comput. Biol. 2 E 140
|
[20] |
Fu F, Chen X, Liu L and Wang L 2007 Physica A 383 651
|
[21] |
Fu F, Hauert C, Nowak M A and Wang L 2008 Phys. Rev. E 78 026117
|
[22] |
Ren J, Wu X, Wang W X, Chen G and Wang B H 2006 arXiv: physics/0605250v2
|
[23] |
Suzuki R, Kato M and Arita T 2008 Phys. Rev. E 77 021911
|
[24] |
Tanimoto J 2007 Phys. Rev. E 76 021126
|
[25] |
Szolnoki S, Perc M and Danku Z 2008 Europhys. Lett. 84 50007
|
[26] |
Szolnoki A and Perc M 2008 arXiv:0812.1122
|
[27] |
Guan J Y, Wu Z X and Wang Y H 2007 Chin. Phys. 16 3566
|
[28] |
Gross T, Dommar D'Lima C J and Blasius B 2006 Phys. Rev. Lett. 96 208701
|
[29] |
Frasca M, Buscarino A, Rizzo A, Fortuna L and Boccaletti S 2006 Phys. Rev. E 74 036110
|
[30] |
Gross T and Blasius B 2007 arXiv: 0709.1858v2
|
[31] |
Maynard Smith J 1982 Evolution and the Theory of Games (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press)
|
[32] |
Colman A M 1995 Game Theory and its Applications in the Social and Biological Sciences (Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann)
|
[33] |
Hofbauer J and Sigmund K 1998 Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press)
|
[34] |
Axelrod R and Hamilton W D 1981 Science 211 1390
|
[35] |
Axelrod R 1984 The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books)
|
[36] |
Nowak M and May R M 1992 Nature (London) 359 826
|
|
[ 36a]Nowak M and May R M 1993 Int. J. Bifurcation Chaos Appl. Sci. Eng. 3 35
|
[37] |
Szab\'{o G and Toke C 1998 Phys. Rev. E 58 69
|
[38] |
Hauert C and Doebeli M 2004 Nature 428 643
|
[39] |
Abramson G and Kuperman M 2001 Phys. Rev. E 63 030901
|
[40] |
Kim B J, Trusina A, Holme P, Minnhagen P, Chuang J S and Choi M Y 2002 Phys. Rev. E 66 021907
|
[41] |
Fu F, Liu L H and Wang L 2007 Eur. Phys. J. B 56 367
|
[42] |
Tang C L, Wang W X, Wu X and Wang B H 2006 Eur. Phys. J. B 53 411
|
[43] |
Wu Z X, Xu X J, Chen Y and Wang Y H 2005 Phys. Rev. E 71 036107
|
|
[ 43a]{Wu Z X, Guan J Y, Xu X J and Wang Y H 2007 Physica A 379 672
|
[44] |
Szolnoki A, Perc M and Szab\'{o G 2008 Eur. Phys. J. B 61 505
|
[45] |
Santos F C and Pacheco J M 2005 Phys. Rev. Lett. 95 098104
|
[46] |
Liu Y K, Li Z, Chen X J and Wang L 2009 Chin. Phys. Lett. 26 048902
|
[47] |
Gao K, Han X P, Wang B H and Yang H X 2008 Chin. Phys. B 17 2759
|
[48] |
Chen X J, Li Z, Li Y K and Wang L 2009 Chin. Phys. B 18 2623
|
[49] |
Szab\'{o G and F\'{ath G 2007 Phys. Rep. 446 97
|
[50] |
Ren J, Wang W X and Qi F 2007 Phys. Rev. E 75 045101(R)
|
[51] |
Wu Z X, Xu X J, Huang Z G, Wang S J and Wang Y H 2006 Phys. Rev. E 74 021107
|
[52] |
Rong Z H, Li X and Wang X F 2007 Phys. Rev. E 76 027101
|
[53] |
Portugali J 2000 Self-Organization and the City (Berlin: Springer)
|
[54] |
Dunbar R, Knight C and Power C (Eds.) 1999 The Evolution of Culture. An Interdisciplinary View (New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press)
|
No Suggested Reading articles found! |
|
|
Viewed |
|
|
|
Full text
|
|
|
|
|
Abstract
|
|
|
|
|
Cited |
|
|
|
|
Altmetric
|
blogs
Facebook pages
Wikipedia page
Google+ users
|
Online attention
Altmetric calculates a score based on the online attention an article receives. Each coloured thread in the circle represents a different type of online attention. The number in the centre is the Altmetric score. Social media and mainstream news media are the main sources that calculate the score. Reference managers such as Mendeley are also tracked but do not contribute to the score. Older articles often score higher because they have had more time to get noticed. To account for this, Altmetric has included the context data for other articles of a similar age.
View more on Altmetrics
|
|
|