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Influence of memory effects on quantum Stackelberg duopoly game under amplitude damping channel |
| Xiang-Ping Liao(廖湘萍)† and Xin-Yi Wang(王馨仪) |
| College of Science, Hunan University of Technology, Zhuzhou 412008, China |
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Abstract We study the influence of memory effects on the quantum Stackelberg duopoly game through an amplitude-damping channel where successive uses of the channels are correlated. It is shown that the memory effects can drastically change the Nash equilibrium and the payoffs of the two firms. As the degree of channel memory increases, there exists a Nash equilibrium for the entire range of the entanglement parameter. Similarly, the presence of memory ensures the existence of the Nash equilibrium for the whole range of the decoherence parameter both for entangled and unentangled initial states. Moreover, quantum memory leads to a ‘critical point’ of the damping parameter, at which both firms are equally benefited. With the maximum-memory effect, the position of the ‘critical point’ moves to the place of fully decohered.
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Received: 08 October 2025
Revised: 10 November 2025
Accepted manuscript online: 09 December 2025
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PACS:
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02.50.Le
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(Decision theory and game theory)
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03.67.-a
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(Quantum information)
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05.30.-d
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(Quantum statistical mechanics)
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| Fund: Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. U2031135). |
Corresponding Authors:
Xiang-Ping Liao
E-mail: liaoxp1@126.com
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Cite this article:
Xiang-Ping Liao(廖湘萍) and Xin-Yi Wang(王馨仪) Influence of memory effects on quantum Stackelberg duopoly game under amplitude damping channel 2026 Chin. Phys. B 35 080203
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