中国物理B ›› 2003, Vol. 12 ›› Issue (9): 931-935.doi: 10.1088/1009-1963/12/9/301
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全宏俊1, 贺鹏2, 王卫宁2, 谢彦波2, 杨伟松3, 汪秉宏4
Yang Wei-Song (杨伟松)a, Wang Bing-Hong (汪秉宏)ab, He Peng (贺鹏)b, Wang Wei-Ning (王卫宁)b, Quan Hong-Jun (全宏俊)c, Xie Yan-Bo (谢彦波)b
摘要: In this paper, we propose and study a new evolution model of minority game. Any strategy in minority game can be regarded as composed of sub-strategies corresponding to different histories. Based on the evolution model proposed by Li-Riolo-Savit, in which those agents that perform poorly may update their strategies randomly. This paper presents a new evolution model in which poor agents update their strategies by changing only a part of sub-strategy sets with low success rate. Simulation result shows that the new model with sub-strategy-set updating evolution mechanism may approach its steady state more quickly than the Li-Riolo-Savit model. In the steady state of the new model, stronger adaptive cooperation among agents will appear, implying that the social resource can be allocated more rationally and utilized more effectively compared with the Li-Riolo-Savit model.
中图分类号: (Decision theory and game theory)