中国物理B ›› 2003, Vol. 12 ›› Issue (9): 931-935.doi: 10.1088/1009-1963/12/9/301

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Sub-strategy updating evolution in minority game

全宏俊1, 贺鹏2, 王卫宁2, 谢彦波2, 杨伟松3, 汪秉宏4   

  1. (1)Department of Applied Physics, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510641, China; (2)Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China; (3)Nonlinear Science Center, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China; (4)Nonlinear Science Center, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China; Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China
  • 收稿日期:2003-04-24 修回日期:2003-01-10 出版日期:2003-09-16 发布日期:2005-03-16
  • 基金资助:
    Project supported by the State Key Development Programme of Basic Research of China, the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos 19974039, 19932020, 59876039 and 70271070), and the China-Canada University Industry Partnership Program (CCUIPP-NSFC No 70142005).

Sub-strategy updating evolution in minority game

Yang Wei-Song (杨伟松)a, Wang Bing-Hong (汪秉宏)ab, He Peng (贺鹏)b, Wang Wei-Ning (王卫宁)b, Quan Hong-Jun (全宏俊)c, Xie Yan-Bo (谢彦波)b   

  1. a Nonlinear Science Center, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China; b Nonlinear Science Center, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China; c Department of Applied Physics, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510641, China
  • Received:2003-04-24 Revised:2003-01-10 Online:2003-09-16 Published:2005-03-16
  • Supported by:
    Project supported by the State Key Development Programme of Basic Research of China, the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos 19974039, 19932020, 59876039 and 70271070), and the China-Canada University Industry Partnership Program (CCUIPP-NSFC No 70142005).

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摘要： In this paper, we propose and study a new evolution model of minority game. Any strategy in minority game can be regarded as composed of sub-strategies corresponding to different histories. Based on the evolution model proposed by Li－Riolo－Savit, in which those agents that perform poorly may update their strategies randomly. This paper presents a new evolution model in which poor agents update their strategies by changing only a part of sub-strategy sets with low success rate. Simulation result shows that the new model with sub-strategy-set updating evolution mechanism may approach its steady state more quickly than the Li－Riolo－Savit model. In the steady state of the new model, stronger adaptive cooperation among agents will appear, implying that the social resource can be allocated more rationally and utilized more effectively compared with the Li－Riolo－Savit model.

Abstract: In this paper, we propose and study a new evolution model of minority game. Any strategy in minority game can be regarded as composed of sub-strategies corresponding to different histories. Based on the evolution model proposed by Li－Riolo－Savit, in which those agents that perform poorly may update their strategies randomly. This paper presents a new evolution model in which poor agents update their strategies by changing only a part of sub-strategy sets with low success rate. Simulation result shows that the new model with sub-strategy-set updating evolution mechanism may approach its steady state more quickly than the Li－Riolo－Savit model. In the steady state of the new model, stronger adaptive cooperation among agents will appear, implying that the social resource can be allocated more rationally and utilized more effectively compared with the Li－Riolo－Savit model.

Key words: minority game, sub-strategy-set, adaptation, evolution model

中图分类号:  (Decision theory and game theory)

  • 02.50.Le
05.90.+m (Other topics in statistical physics, thermodynamics, and nonlinear dynamical systems)