中国物理B ›› 2020, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (7): 70201-070201.doi: 10.1088/1674-1056/ab8c3c

• GENERAL •    下一篇

The impact of honesty and trickery on a Bayesian quantum prisoners' dilemma game

Bo-Yang Liu(刘博阳), Xin Zhao(赵鑫), Hong-Yi Dai(戴宏毅), Ming Zhang(张明), Ying Liao(廖鹰), Xiao-Feng Guo(郭晓峰), Wei Gao(郜伟)   

  1. 1 Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou 450001, China;
    2 College of Artificial Intelligence, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China;
    3 Department of Physics, College of Science, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China;
    4 Interdisciplinary Center for Quantum Information, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China
  • 收稿日期:2020-01-22 修回日期:2020-04-07 出版日期:2020-07-05 发布日期:2020-07-05
  • 通讯作者: Bo-Yang Liu E-mail:boyangliu2011@hotmail.com
  • 基金资助:
    Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61773399, 61673389, and 61273202) and the Special Funded Project of China Postdoctoral Science Foundation (Grant No. 2017T100792).

The impact of honesty and trickery on a Bayesian quantum prisoners' dilemma game

Bo-Yang Liu(刘博阳)1, Xin Zhao(赵鑫)2, Hong-Yi Dai(戴宏毅)3,4, Ming Zhang(张明)2, Ying Liao(廖鹰)1, Xiao-Feng Guo(郭晓峰)1, Wei Gao(郜伟)1   

  1. 1 Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou 450001, China;
    2 College of Artificial Intelligence, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China;
    3 Department of Physics, College of Science, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China;
    4 Interdisciplinary Center for Quantum Information, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China
  • Received:2020-01-22 Revised:2020-04-07 Online:2020-07-05 Published:2020-07-05
  • Contact: Bo-Yang Liu E-mail:boyangliu2011@hotmail.com
  • Supported by:
    Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61773399, 61673389, and 61273202) and the Special Funded Project of China Postdoctoral Science Foundation (Grant No. 2017T100792).

摘要: To explore the influence of quantum information on the common social problem of honesty and trickery, we propose a Bayesian model for the quantum prisoners' dilemma game. In this model, the players' strategy formation is regarded as a negotiation of their move contract based on their types of decision policies, honesty or trickery. Although the implementation of quantum information cannot eliminate tricky players, players in our model can always end up with higher payoffs than in the classical game. For a good proportion of a credibility parameter value, a rational player will take an honest action, which is in remarkable contrast to the observation that players tend to defect in the classical prisoners' dilemma game. This research suggests that honesty will be promoted to enhance cooperation with the assistance of quantum information resources.

关键词: quantum game, Bayesian game, quantum contract

Abstract: To explore the influence of quantum information on the common social problem of honesty and trickery, we propose a Bayesian model for the quantum prisoners' dilemma game. In this model, the players' strategy formation is regarded as a negotiation of their move contract based on their types of decision policies, honesty or trickery. Although the implementation of quantum information cannot eliminate tricky players, players in our model can always end up with higher payoffs than in the classical game. For a good proportion of a credibility parameter value, a rational player will take an honest action, which is in remarkable contrast to the observation that players tend to defect in the classical prisoners' dilemma game. This research suggests that honesty will be promoted to enhance cooperation with the assistance of quantum information resources.

Key words: quantum game, Bayesian game, quantum contract

中图分类号:  (Decision theory and game theory)

  • 02.50.Le
03.67.Hk (Quantum communication) 03.67.-a (Quantum information)