中国物理B ›› 2015, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (9): 90305-090305.doi: 10.1088/1674-1056/24/9/090305

• GENERAL • 上一篇    下一篇

Countermeasure against probabilistic blinding attack in practical quantum key distribution systems

钱泳君a b, 李宏伟a b c, 何德勇a b, 银振强a b, 张春梅a b, 陈巍a b, 王双a b, 韩正甫a b   

  1. a Key Laboratory of Quantum Information, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China;
    b Synergetic Innovation Center of Quantum Information & Quantum Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China;
    c Zhengzhou Information Science and Technology Institute, Zhengzhou 450004, China
  • 收稿日期:2015-02-27 修回日期:2015-05-06 出版日期:2015-09-05 发布日期:2015-09-05
  • 基金资助:

    Project supported by the National Basic Research Program of China (Grant Nos. 2011CBA00200 and 2011CB921200), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61475148, 61201239, 61205118, and 11304397), and the China Postdoctoral Science Foundation (Grant No. 2013M540514).

Countermeasure against probabilistic blinding attack in practical quantum key distribution systems

Qian Yong-Jun (钱泳君)a b, Li Hong-Wei (李宏伟)a b c, He De-Yong (何德勇)a b, Yin Zhen-Qiang (银振强)a b, Zhang Chun-Mei (张春梅)a b, Chen Wei (陈巍)a b, Wang Shuang (王双)a b, Han Zheng-Fu (韩正甫)a b   

  1. a Key Laboratory of Quantum Information, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China;
    b Synergetic Innovation Center of Quantum Information & Quantum Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China;
    c Zhengzhou Information Science and Technology Institute, Zhengzhou 450004, China
  • Received:2015-02-27 Revised:2015-05-06 Online:2015-09-05 Published:2015-09-05
  • Contact: Li Hong-Wei, Yin Zhen-Qiang E-mail:lihw@mail.ustc.edu.cn;yinzheqi@mail.ustc.edu.cn
  • Supported by:

    Project supported by the National Basic Research Program of China (Grant Nos. 2011CBA00200 and 2011CB921200), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61475148, 61201239, 61205118, and 11304397), and the China Postdoctoral Science Foundation (Grant No. 2013M540514).

摘要:

In a practical quantum key distribution (QKD) system, imperfect equipment, especially the single-photon detector, can be eavesdropped on by a blinding attack. However, the original blinding attack may be discovered by directly detecting the current. In this paper, we propose a probabilistic blinding attack model, where Eve probabilistically applies a blinding attack without being caught by using only an existing intuitive countermeasure. More precisely, our countermeasure solves the problem of how to define the bound in the limitation of precision of current detection, and then we prove security of the practical system by considering the current parameter. Meanwhile, we discuss the bound of the quantum bit error rate (QBER) introduced by Eve, by which Eve can acquire information without the countermeasure.

关键词: countermeasure bound, single-photon detector, probabilistic blinding attack, quantum key distribution

Abstract:

In a practical quantum key distribution (QKD) system, imperfect equipment, especially the single-photon detector, can be eavesdropped on by a blinding attack. However, the original blinding attack may be discovered by directly detecting the current. In this paper, we propose a probabilistic blinding attack model, where Eve probabilistically applies a blinding attack without being caught by using only an existing intuitive countermeasure. More precisely, our countermeasure solves the problem of how to define the bound in the limitation of precision of current detection, and then we prove security of the practical system by considering the current parameter. Meanwhile, we discuss the bound of the quantum bit error rate (QBER) introduced by Eve, by which Eve can acquire information without the countermeasure.

Key words: countermeasure bound, single-photon detector, probabilistic blinding attack, quantum key distribution

中图分类号:  (Quantum cryptography and communication security)

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