中国物理B ›› 2009, Vol. 18 ›› Issue (7): 2623-2628.doi: 10.1088/1674-1056/18/7/001

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Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on highly clustered community networks

刘永奎1, 王龙2, 李智3, 陈小杰3   

  1. (1)Center for Complex Systems, Department of Automatic Control Engineering, Xidian University, Xi'an 710071, China; (2)Center for Complex Systems, Department of Automatic Control Engineering, Xidian University, Xi'an 710071, China;State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems,Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University,Beijing 100871, China; (3)Center for Complex Systems, Department of Automatic Control Engineering, Xidian University, Xi'an 710071,China
  • 收稿日期:2008-09-09 修回日期:2008-10-24 出版日期:2009-07-20 发布日期:2009-07-20
  • 基金资助:
    Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos 70671079, 60674050, 60736022 and 60528007), National 973 Program (Grant No 2002CB312200), National 863 Program (Grant No 2006AA04Z258) and 11-5 project (Grant No A2120061303).

Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on highly clustered community networks

Liu Yong-Kui(刘永奎)a)†, Li Zhi(李智)a)‡, Chen Xiao-Jie(陈小杰)b), and Wang Long(王龙)a)b)\S   

  1. a Center for Complex Systems, Department of Automatic Control Engineering, Xidian University, Xi'an 710071, China; b State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems,Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University,Beijing 100871, China
  • Received:2008-09-09 Revised:2008-10-24 Online:2009-07-20 Published:2009-07-20
  • Supported by:
    Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos 70671079, 60674050, 60736022 and 60528007), National 973 Program (Grant No 2002CB312200), National 863 Program (Grant No 2006AA04Z258) and 11-5 project (Grant No A2120061303).

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摘要： This paper studies the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on a highly clustered community network in which the clustering coefficient and the community size can be tuned. It finds that the clustering coefficient in such a degree-homogeneous network inhibits the emergence of cooperation for the entire range of the payoff parameter. Moreover, it finds that the community size can also have a marked influence on the evolution of cooperation, with a larger community size leading to not only a lower cooperation level but also a smaller threshold of the payoff parameter above which cooperators become extinct.

Abstract: This paper studies the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on a highly clustered community network in which the clustering coefficient and the community size can be tuned. It finds that the clustering coefficient in such a degree-homogeneous network inhibits the emergence of cooperation for the entire range of the payoff parameter. Moreover, it finds that the community size can also have a marked influence on the evolution of cooperation, with a larger community size leading to not only a lower cooperation level but also a smaller threshold of the payoff parameter above which cooperators become extinct.

Key words: prisoner's dilemma, cooperation, clustering coefficient, community structure

中图分类号:  (Decision theory and game theory)

  • 02.50.Le
89.65.-s (Social and economic systems) 89.75.Hc (Networks and genealogical trees)