中国物理B ›› 2016, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (11): 110305-110305.doi: 10.1088/1674-1056/25/11/110305

• GENERAL • 上一篇    下一篇

Cryptanalysis of quantum broadcast communication and authentication protocol with a one-time pad

Ya Cao(曹雅), Fei Gao(高飞)   

  1. 1 State Key Laboratory of Networking and Switching Technology, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, China;
    2 State Key Laboratory of Cryptology, Beijing 100878, China
  • 收稿日期:2016-05-23 修回日期:2016-07-07 出版日期:2016-11-05 发布日期:2016-11-05
  • 通讯作者: Fei Gao E-mail:caoshinee@126.com
  • 基金资助:

    Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61272057 and 61170270).

Cryptanalysis of quantum broadcast communication and authentication protocol with a one-time pad

Ya Cao(曹雅)1,2, Fei Gao(高飞)1   

  1. 1 State Key Laboratory of Networking and Switching Technology, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, China;
    2 State Key Laboratory of Cryptology, Beijing 100878, China
  • Received:2016-05-23 Revised:2016-07-07 Online:2016-11-05 Published:2016-11-05
  • Contact: Fei Gao E-mail:caoshinee@126.com
  • Supported by:

    Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61272057 and 61170270).

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摘要：

Chang et al. [Chin. Phys. B 23 010305 (2014)] have proposed a quantum broadcast communication and authentication protocol. However, we find that an intercept-resend attack can be preformed successfully by a potential eavesdropper, who will be able to destroy the authentication function. Afterwards, he or she can acquire the secret transmitted message or even modify it while escaping detection, by implementing an efficient man-in-the-middle attack. Furthermore, we show a simple scheme to defend this attack, that is, applying non-reusable identity strings.

关键词: quantum broadcast communication, quantum secure direct communication, Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger(GHZ) state, authentication

Abstract:

Chang et al. [Chin. Phys. B 23 010305 (2014)] have proposed a quantum broadcast communication and authentication protocol. However, we find that an intercept-resend attack can be preformed successfully by a potential eavesdropper, who will be able to destroy the authentication function. Afterwards, he or she can acquire the secret transmitted message or even modify it while escaping detection, by implementing an efficient man-in-the-middle attack. Furthermore, we show a simple scheme to defend this attack, that is, applying non-reusable identity strings.

Key words: quantum broadcast communication, quantum secure direct communication, Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger(GHZ) state, authentication

中图分类号:  (Quantum cryptography and communication security)

  • 03.67.Dd
03.67.Hk (Quantum communication) 03.67.-a (Quantum information) 03.65.Ud (Entanglement and quantum nonlocality)