Punishment in optional public goods games

doi:10.1088/1674-1056/19/11/110201

中国物理B ›› 2010, Vol. 19 ›› Issue (11): 110201-110303.doi: 10.1088/1674-1056/19/11/110201

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Punishment in optional public goods games

王震¹, 张连众¹, 许照锦²

(1)School of Physics, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China; (2)School of Science, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, China

收稿日期:2010-05-17 修回日期:2010-06-28 出版日期:2010-11-15 发布日期:2010-11-15
基金资助:
Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 10672081), and the Center for Asia Studies of Nankai University (Grant No. 2010-5).

Punishment in optional public goods games

Wang Zhen(王震)^a),Xu Zhao-Jin(许照锦)^b), and Zhang Lian-Zhong(张连众)^a)^†

^a School of Physics, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China; ^b School of Science, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, China

Received:2010-05-17 Revised:2010-06-28 Online:2010-11-15 Published:2010-11-15
Supported by:
Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 10672081), and the Center for Asia Studies of Nankai University (Grant No. 2010-5).

摘要/Abstract

摘要： In this work, the optional public goods games with punishment are studied. By adopting the approximate best response dynamics, a micro model is given to explain the evolutionary process. Simultaneously, the magnitude of rationality is also considered. Under the condition of bounded rationality which provides a light to interpret phenomena in human society, the model leads to two types of equilibriums. One is the equilibrium without punishers and the other is the equilibrium including only punishers and cooperators. In addition, the effects of rationality on equilibriums are briefly investigated.

Abstract: In this work, the optional public goods games with punishment are studied. By adopting the approximate best response dynamics, a micro model is given to explain the evolutionary process. Simultaneously, the magnitude of rationality is also considered. Under the condition of bounded rationality which provides a light to interpret phenomena in human society, the model leads to two types of equilibriums. One is the equilibrium without punishers and the other is the equilibrium including only punishers and cooperators. In addition, the effects of rationality on equilibriums are briefly investigated.

Key words: public goods games, rationality, equilibrium

中图分类号: (Decision theory and game theory)

02.50.Le

87.23.Ge (Dynamics of social systems) 87.23.Kg (Dynamics of evolution)

王震, 许照锦, 张连众. Punishment in optional public goods games[J]. 中国物理B, 2010, 19(11): 110201-110303.

Wang Zhen(王震),Xu Zhao-Jin(许照锦), and Zhang Lian-Zhong(张连众). Punishment in optional public goods games[J]. Chin. Phys. B, 2010, 19(11): 110201-110303.

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