中国物理B ›› 2012, Vol. 21 ›› Issue (6): 60303-060303.doi: 10.1088/1674-1056/21/6/060303

• GENERAL • 上一篇    下一篇

Security proof of counterfactual quantum cryptography against general intercept-resend attacks and its vulnerability

张盛, 王剑, 唐朝京   

  1. School of Electronic Science and Engineering, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China
  • 收稿日期:2011-10-23 修回日期:2012-01-04 出版日期:2012-05-01 发布日期:2012-05-01
  • 基金资助:
    Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No 60872052).

Security proof of counterfactual quantum cryptography against general intercept-resend attacks and its vulnerability

Zhang Sheng(张盛), Wang Jian(王剑), and Tang Chao-Jing(唐朝京)   

  1. School of Electronic Science and Engineering, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China
  • Received:2011-10-23 Revised:2012-01-04 Online:2012-05-01 Published:2012-05-01
  • Contact: Zhang Sheng E-mail:shengzhcn@gmail.com
  • Supported by:
    Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No 60872052).

摘要: Counterfactual quantum cryptography, recently proposed by Noh, is featured with no transmission of signal particles. This exhibits evident security advantages, such as its immunity to the well-known photon-number-splitting attack. In this paper, the theoretical security of counterfactual quantum cryptography protocol against the general intercept-resend attacks is proved by bounding the information of an eavesdropper Eve more tightly than in Yin's proposal [Phys. Rev. A 82 042335 (2010)]. It is also shown that practical counterfactual quantum cryptography implementations may be vulnerable when equipped with imperfect apparatuses, by proving that a negative key rate can be achieved when Eve launches a time-shift attack based on imperfect detector efficiency.

关键词: quantum cryptography, quantum counterfactuality, quantum information

Abstract: Counterfactual quantum cryptography, recently proposed by Noh, is featured with no transmission of signal particles. This exhibits evident security advantages, such as its immunity to the well-known photon-number-splitting attack. In this paper, the theoretical security of counterfactual quantum cryptography protocol against the general intercept-resend attacks is proved by bounding the information of an eavesdropper Eve more tightly than in Yin's proposal [Phys. Rev. A 82 042335 (2010)]. It is also shown that practical counterfactual quantum cryptography implementations may be vulnerable when equipped with imperfect apparatuses, by proving that a negative key rate can be achieved when Eve launches a time-shift attack based on imperfect detector efficiency.

Key words: quantum cryptography, quantum counterfactuality, quantum information

中图分类号:  (Quantum cryptography and communication security)

  • 03.67.Dd
03.67.Hk (Quantum communication) 42.50.Ex (Optical implementations of quantum information processing and transfer)