中国物理B ›› 2010, Vol. 19 ›› Issue (10): 100204-100204.doi: 10.1088/1674-1056/19/10/100204
王震1, 黄建华1, 张连众1, 许照锦2
Wang Zhen(王震)a),Xu Zhao-Jin(许照锦)b), Huang Jian-Hua(黄建华)a), and Zhang Lian-Zhong(张连众)a)†
摘要: In this paper, we study the public goods games with punishment by adopting the well-known approximate best response dynamics. It shows that the evolution of cooperation is affected by two aspects when other parameters are fixed. One is the punishment mechanism which can avoid the dilemma of lacking investment, and the other is the degree of rationality. Theoretical analysis and numerical results indicate that the existence of punishment mechanism and distribution of rationality are the keys to the enhancement of cooperation level. We also testify that they can heavily influence the payoffs of system as well. The findings in this paper may provide a deeper understanding of some social dilemmas.
中图分类号: (Decision theory and game theory)