Evolutionary dynamics of tax-based strong altruistic reward and punishment in a public goods game

doi:10.1088/1674-1056/ad5274

中国物理B ›› 2024, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (9): 90205-090205.doi: 10.1088/1674-1056/ad5274

Evolutionary dynamics of tax-based strong altruistic reward and punishment in a public goods game

Zhi-Hao Yang(杨智昊) and Yan-Long Yang(杨彦龙)†

Mathematics and Statistics School, Guizhou University, Guiyang 550025, China

收稿日期:2024-02-28 修回日期:2024-05-14 接受日期:2024-05-31 发布日期:2024-08-15
通讯作者: Yan-Long Yang E-mail:yylong1980@163.com
基金资助:
Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 71961003).

Evolutionary dynamics of tax-based strong altruistic reward and punishment in a public goods game

Zhi-Hao Yang(杨智昊) and Yan-Long Yang(杨彦龙)†

Mathematics and Statistics School, Guizhou University, Guiyang 550025, China

Received:2024-02-28 Revised:2024-05-14 Accepted:2024-05-31 Published:2024-08-15
Contact: Yan-Long Yang E-mail:yylong1980@163.com
Supported by:
Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 71961003).

摘要/Abstract

摘要： In public goods games, punishments and rewards have been shown to be effective mechanisms for maintaining individual cooperation. However, punishments and rewards are costly to incentivize cooperation. Therefore, the generation of costly penalties and rewards has been a complex problem in promoting the development of cooperation. In real society, specialized institutions exist to punish evil people or reward good people by collecting taxes. We propose a strong altruistic punishment or reward strategy in the public goods game through this phenomenon. Through theoretical analysis and numerical calculation, we can get that tax-based strong altruistic punishment (reward) has more evolutionary advantages than traditional strong altruistic punishment (reward) in maintaining cooperation and tax-based strong altruistic reward leads to a higher level of cooperation than tax-based strong altruistic punishment.

关键词: evolutionary game theory, strong altruism, punishment, reward

Abstract: In public goods games, punishments and rewards have been shown to be effective mechanisms for maintaining individual cooperation. However, punishments and rewards are costly to incentivize cooperation. Therefore, the generation of costly penalties and rewards has been a complex problem in promoting the development of cooperation. In real society, specialized institutions exist to punish evil people or reward good people by collecting taxes. We propose a strong altruistic punishment or reward strategy in the public goods game through this phenomenon. Through theoretical analysis and numerical calculation, we can get that tax-based strong altruistic punishment (reward) has more evolutionary advantages than traditional strong altruistic punishment (reward) in maintaining cooperation and tax-based strong altruistic reward leads to a higher level of cooperation than tax-based strong altruistic punishment.

Key words: evolutionary game theory, strong altruism, punishment, reward

中图分类号: (Decision theory and game theory)

02.50.Le

05.45.Pq (Numerical simulations of chaotic systems) 02.60.Cb (Numerical simulation; solution of equations)

Zhi-Hao Yang(杨智昊) and Yan-Long Yang(杨彦龙). Evolutionary dynamics of tax-based strong altruistic reward and punishment in a public goods game[J]. 中国物理B, 2024, 33(9): 90205-090205.

Zhi-Hao Yang(杨智昊) and Yan-Long Yang(杨彦龙). Evolutionary dynamics of tax-based strong altruistic reward and punishment in a public goods game[J]. Chin. Phys. B, 2024, 33(9): 90205-090205.

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Evolutionary dynamics of tax-based strong altruistic reward and punishment in a public goods game

Evolutionary dynamics of tax-based strong altruistic reward and punishment in a public goods game

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