Effects of the planarity and heterogeneity of networks on evolutionary two-player games

We study the effects of the planarity and heterogeneity of networks on evolutionary two-player symmetric games by considering four different kinds of networks, including two types of heterogeneous networks:the weighted planar stochastic lattice (a planar scale-free network) and the random uncorrelated scale-free network with the same degree distribution as the weighted planar stochastic lattice; and two types of homogeneous networks:the hexagonal lattice and the random regular network with the same degree k₀=6 as the hexagonal lattice. Using extensive computer simulations, we found that both the planarity and heterogeneity of the network have a significant influence on the evolution of cooperation, either promotion or inhibition, depending not only on the specific kind of game (the Harmony, Snowdrift, Stag Hunt or Prisoner's Dilemma games), but also on the update rule (the Fermi, replicator or unconditional imitation rules).