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Impact of peer pressure on cooperation evolution in the networked prisoner’s dilemma game with migration mechanisms |
| Xianjia Wang(王先甲)2, Yanan Li(李亚楠)1,†, and Zhipeng Yang(杨志鹏)3 |
1 Hubei Province Key Laboratory of Systems Science in Metallurgical Process, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430065, China;
2 Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China;
3 School of Computer and Information Technology, Xinyang Normal University, Xinyang 464000, China |
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Abstract In social and ecological systems, individual migration behavior and peer pressure are crucial factors influencing decision-making and cooperative behavior. However, how migration regulates the evolution of cooperation and the specific role of peer pressure in this process remain to be further investigated. To address this, this study develops a model that incorporates migration mechanisms and peer pressure within the framework of the networked prisoner’s dilemma game. Specifically, we modify the population structure and introduce a migration strategy based on payoff maximization, enabling individuals to dynamically adjust their positions according to the local environment. The model also considers the impact of peer pressure on individual decision-making and introduces heterogeneity in individuals’ sensitivity to pressure, thereby systematically examining the role of both factors in the evolution of cooperative behavior. Based on this framework, we further compare our model with a scenario in which no migration mechanism is present to evaluate its impact on cooperative dynamics. The results reveal that the migration mechanism significantly promotes the evolution of cooperative behavior. Under this mechanism, higher individual sensitivity leads to an increased level of cooperation, and stronger peer pressure intensity more effectively enhances the promotion of cooperation. Additionally, the influence of population structure on cooperation frequency cannot be overlooked. An increase in vacant nodes provides cooperators with greater buffering space and more migration opportunities, making cooperative behavior more stable and facilitating its propagation within the system. These findings suggest that appropriately regulating individual mobility and reinforcing peer pressure constraints can enhance the stability and propagation of cooperative behavior, providing significant theoretical support for social governance, organizational management, and group collaboration.
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Received: 22 February 2025
Revised: 18 April 2025
Accepted manuscript online: 13 June 2025
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PACS:
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02.50.Le
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(Decision theory and game theory)
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87.23.Ge
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(Dynamics of social systems)
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07.05.Tp
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(Computer modeling and simulation)
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89.75.Fb
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(Structures and organization in complex systems)
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| Fund: This work was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 72031009) and Major Project of the National Social Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 20&ZD058). |
Corresponding Authors:
Yanan Li
E-mail: lynlynlyn0312@126.com
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Cite this article:
Xianjia Wang(王先甲), Yanan Li(李亚楠), and Zhipeng Yang(杨志鹏) Impact of peer pressure on cooperation evolution in the networked prisoner’s dilemma game with migration mechanisms 2025 Chin. Phys. B 34 110201
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