中国物理B ›› 2023, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (10): 100502-100502.doi: 10.1088/1674-1056/acd2b5

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Dynamic decision and its complex dynamics analysis of low-carbon supply chain considering risk-aversion under carbon tax policy

Jin-Chai Lin(林金钗)1,†, Ru-Guo Fan(范如国)2, Yuan-Yuan Wang(王圆缘)2, and Kang Du(杜康)2   

  1. 1 Management School, Chongqing University of Technology, Chongqing 400054, China;
    2 Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
  • 收稿日期:2023-03-21 修回日期:2023-04-23 接受日期:2023-05-05 出版日期:2023-09-21 发布日期:2023-09-22
  • 通讯作者: Jin-Chai Lin E-mail:jc_lin@cqut.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    Project supported by the Social Science Planning Project of Chongqing, China (Grant No. 2022BS069), the Science and Technology Research Project of Chongqing Education Committee, China (Grant No. KJQN202201140), the National Social Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 20&ZD155), and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 72061003).

Dynamic decision and its complex dynamics analysis of low-carbon supply chain considering risk-aversion under carbon tax policy

Jin-Chai Lin(林金钗)1,†, Ru-Guo Fan(范如国)2, Yuan-Yuan Wang(王圆缘)2, and Kang Du(杜康)2   

  1. 1 Management School, Chongqing University of Technology, Chongqing 400054, China;
    2 Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
  • Received:2023-03-21 Revised:2023-04-23 Accepted:2023-05-05 Online:2023-09-21 Published:2023-09-22
  • Contact: Jin-Chai Lin E-mail:jc_lin@cqut.edu.cn
  • Supported by:
    Project supported by the Social Science Planning Project of Chongqing, China (Grant No. 2022BS069), the Science and Technology Research Project of Chongqing Education Committee, China (Grant No. KJQN202201140), the National Social Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 20&ZD155), and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 72061003).

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摘要： This study establishes a low-carbon supply chain game model under the centralized decision situation and the decentralized decision situation considering the manufacturer risk-aversion behavior, and discusses the influence of the manufacturer risk-aversion behavior on the optimal decision, profit, coordination, and complex dynamics of the supply chain. We find that comparing with the risk-neutral decentralized decision, the increase of manufacturer's risk tolerance attitude can narrow the gap between the supply chain profit and the centralized decision, but it will further reduce the carbon emission reduction level. The increase of risk tolerance of the manufacturer and carbon tax will narrow the stable region of the system. Under this situation, the manufacturer should carefully adjust parameters to prevent the system from losing stability, especially the adjustment parameters for carbon emission reduction level. When the system is in a chaotic state, the increase of carbon tax rate makes the system show more complex dynamic characteristics. Under the chaotic state, it is difficult for the manufacturer to make correct price decision and carbon emission reduction strategy for the next period, which damages its profit, but increases the profit of the retailer and the supply chain. Finally, the carbon emission reduction cost-sharing contract is proposed to improve the carbon emission reduction level and the supply chain efficiency, achieving Pareto improvement. The stability region of the system is larger than that in the centralized decision situation, but the increase of the cost sharing coefficient will reduce the stability of the system in the decentralized decision-making situation.

关键词: carbon tax, risk-avers, low-carbon supply chain, complex dynamics

Abstract: This study establishes a low-carbon supply chain game model under the centralized decision situation and the decentralized decision situation considering the manufacturer risk-aversion behavior, and discusses the influence of the manufacturer risk-aversion behavior on the optimal decision, profit, coordination, and complex dynamics of the supply chain. We find that comparing with the risk-neutral decentralized decision, the increase of manufacturer's risk tolerance attitude can narrow the gap between the supply chain profit and the centralized decision, but it will further reduce the carbon emission reduction level. The increase of risk tolerance of the manufacturer and carbon tax will narrow the stable region of the system. Under this situation, the manufacturer should carefully adjust parameters to prevent the system from losing stability, especially the adjustment parameters for carbon emission reduction level. When the system is in a chaotic state, the increase of carbon tax rate makes the system show more complex dynamic characteristics. Under the chaotic state, it is difficult for the manufacturer to make correct price decision and carbon emission reduction strategy for the next period, which damages its profit, but increases the profit of the retailer and the supply chain. Finally, the carbon emission reduction cost-sharing contract is proposed to improve the carbon emission reduction level and the supply chain efficiency, achieving Pareto improvement. The stability region of the system is larger than that in the centralized decision situation, but the increase of the cost sharing coefficient will reduce the stability of the system in the decentralized decision-making situation.

Key words: carbon tax, risk-avers, low-carbon supply chain, complex dynamics

中图分类号:  (Nonlinear dynamics and chaos)

  • 05.45.-a
05.45.Pq (Numerical simulations of chaotic systems)